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Abstract. The paper analyzes dynamic epistemic logic from a topolog-
ical perspective. The main contribution consists of a framework in which
dynamic epistemic logic satisfies the requirements for being a topological
dynamical system thus interfacing discrete dynamic logics with contin-
uous mappings of dynamical systems. The setting is based on a notion
of logical convergence, demonstratively equivalent with convergence in
Stone topology. Presented is a flexible, parametrized family of metrics
inducing the latter, used as an analytical aid. We show maps induced
by action model transformations continuous with respect to the Stone
topology and present results on the recurrent behavior of said maps.
Keywords: dynamic epistemic logic, limit behavior, convergence, recur-
rence, dynamical systems, metric spaces, general topology, modal logic
1 Introduction
Dynamic epistemic logic is a framework for modeling information dynamics. In it,
systematic change of Kripke models are punctiliously investigated through model
transformers mapping Kripke models to Kripke models. The iterated application
of such a map may constitute a model of information dynamics, or be may be
analyzed purely for its mathematical properties [6, 8, 10,11,13,16,18,40–43].
Dynamical systems theory is a mathematical field studying the long-term
behavior of spaces under the action of a continuous function. In case of discrete
time, this amounts to investigating the space under the iterations of a continuous
map. The field is rich in concepts, methodologies and results developed with the
aim of understanding general dynamics.
The two fields find common ground in the iterated application of maps. With
dynamic epistemic logic analyzing very specific map types, the hope is that
general results from dynamical systems theory may shed light on properties
of the former. There is, however, a chasm between the two: Dynamical systems
theory revolves around spaces imbued with metrical or topological structure with
respect to which maps are continuous. No such structure is found in dynamic
epistemic logic. This chasm has not gone unappreciated: In his 2011 Logical
Dynamics of Information and Interaction [10], van Benthem writes
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From discrete dynamic logics to continuous dynamical systems
“We conclude with what we see as a major challenge. Van Benthem [7, 8]
pointed out how update evolution suggests a long-term perspective that is like
the evolutionary dynamics found in dynamical systems. [...] Interfacing current
dynamic and temporal logics with the continuous realm is a major issue, also
for logic in general.” [10, Sec. 4.8. Emph. is org. heading]
This paper takes on the challenge and attempts to bridge this chasm.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents what we consider natural spaces
when working with modal logic, namely sets of pointed Kripke models modulo
logical equivalence. These are referred to as modal spaces. A natural notion of
“logical convergence” on modal spaces is provided. Section 3 seeks a topology
on modal spaces for which topological convergence coincides with logical con-
vergence. We consider a metric topology based on n-bisimulation and prove it
insufficient, but show an adapted Stone topology satisfactory. Saddened by the
loss of a useful aid, the metric inducing the n-bisimulation topology, a family of
metrics is introduced that all induce the Stone topology, yet allow a variety of
subtle modelling choices. Sets of pointed Kripke models are thus equipped with
a structure of compact metric spaces. Section 4 considers maps on modal spaces
based on multi-pointed action models using product update. Restrictions are
imposed to ensure totality, and the resulting clean maps are shown continuous
with respect to the Stone topology. With that, we present our main contri-
bution: A modal space under the action of a clean map satisfies the standard
requirements for being a topological dynamical system. Section 5 applies the
now-suited terminology from dynamical systems theory, and present some ini-
tial results pertaining to the recurrent behavior of clean maps on modal spaces.
Section 6 concludes the paper by pointing out a variety of future research venues.
Throughout, we situate our work in the literature.
Remark 1. To make explicit what may be apparent, note that the primary con-
cern is the semantics of dynamic epistemic logic, i.e., its models and model
transformation. Syntactical considerations are briefly touched upon in Section 6.
Remark 2. The paper is not self-contained. For notions from modal logic that
remain undefined here, refer to e.g. [14, 27]. For topological notions, refer to
e.g. [37]. For more on dynamic and epistemic logic than the bare minimum
of standard notions and notations rehearsed, see e.g. [2–5, 10, 20, 22, 30, 38, 39].
Finally, a background document containing generalizations and omitted proofs
is our [31].
2 Modal Spaces and Logical Convergence
Let there be given a countable set Φ of atoms and a finite set I of agents.
Where p ∈ Φ and i ∈ I, define the language L by
ϕ := > | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | iϕ.
Modal logics may be formulated in L. By a logic Λ we refer only to ex-
tensions of the minimal normal modal logic K over the language L. With
Λ given by context, let ϕ be the set of formulas Λ-provably equivalent to ϕ.
Denote the resulting partition {ϕ : ϕ ∈ L} of L by LΛ.3 Call LΛ’s elements
Λ-propositions.
We use relational semantics to evaluate formulas. A Kripke model for L is
a tuple M = (JMK , R, J·K) where JMK is a countable, non-empty set of states,
R : I −→ P(JMK × JMK) assigns to each i ∈ I an accessibility relation Ri,
and J·K : Φ −→ P(JMK) is a valuation, assigning to each atom a set of states.
With s ∈ JMK, call Ms = (JMK , R, J·K , s) a pointed Kripke model. The used
semantics are standard, including the modal clause:
Ms  iϕ iff for all t : sRit implies Mt  ϕ.
Throughout, we work with pointed Kripke models. Working with modal logics,
we find it natural to identify pointed Kripke models that are considered equiv-
alent by the logic used. The domains of interest are thus the following type of
quotient spaces:
Definition 1. The LΛ modal space of a set of pointed Kripke models X is the
set X = {x : x ∈ X} for x = {y ∈ X : y  ϕ iff x  ϕ for all ϕ ∈ LΛ}.
Working with an LΛ modal space portrays that we only are interested in differ-
ences between pointed Kripke models insofar as these are modally expressible
and are considered differences by Λ.
In a modal space, how may we conceptualize that a sequence x1,x2, ... con-
verges to some point x? Focusing on the concept from which we derive the notion
of identity in modal spaces, namely Λ-propositions, we find it natural to think
of x1,x2, ... as converging to x just in case xn moves towards satisfying all
the same Λ-propositions as x as n goes to infinity. We thus offer the following
definition:
Definition 2. A sequence of points x1,x2, ... in an LΛ modal space X is said
to logically converge to the point x in X iff for every ϕ ∈ LΛ for which x  ϕ,
there is an N ∈ N such that xn  ϕ for all n ≥ N .
To avoid re-proving useful results concerning this notion of convergence, we
next turn to seeking a topology for which logical convergence coincides with
topological convergence. Recall that for a topology T on a set X, a sequence of
points x1, x2, ... is said to converge to x in the topological space (X, T ) iff
for every open set U ∈ T containing x, there is an N ∈ N such that xn ∈ U for
all n ≥ N .
3 Topologies on Modal Spaces
One way of obtaining a topology on a space is to define a metric for said
space. Several metrics have been suggested for sets of pointed Kripke models
3 LΛ is isomorphic to the domain of the Lindenbaum algebra of Λ.
[1, 17]. These metrics are only defined for finite pointed Kripke models, but
incorporating ideas from the metrics of [36] on shift spaces and [26] on sets of
first-order logical theories allows us to simultaneously generalize and simplify
the n-Bisimulation-based Distance of [17] to the degree of applicability:
Let X be a modal space for which modal equivalence and bisimilarity
coincide4 and let -n relate x, y ∈ X iff x and y are n-bisimilar. Then proving
dB(x,y) =
{
0 if x -n y for all n
1
2n if n is the least intenger such that x 6-n y
a metric on X is trivial. We refer to dB as the n-bisimulation metric, and to
the inducedmetric topology as the n-bisimulation topology, denoted TB . A
basis of the topology TB is given by the set of elements Bxn = {y ∈X : y -n x}.
Considering the intimate link between modal logic and bisimulation, we con-
sider both n-bisimulation metric and topology highly natural.5 Alas, logical con-
vergence does not:
Proposition 1. Logical convergence in arbitrary modal space X does not imply
convergence in the topological space (X, TB).
Proof. LetX be anLΛ modal space with L based on the atoms Φ = {pk : k ∈ N}.
Let x ∈ X satisfy ⊥ and pk for all k ∈ N. Let x1,x2, ... be a sequence in X
such that for all k ∈ N, xk satisfies ⊥, pm for all m ≤ k, and ¬pl for all l > k.
Then for all ϕ ∈ LΛ for which x  ϕ, there is an N such that xn  ϕ for all
n ≥ N , hence the sequence x1,x2, ... converges to x.There does not, however,
exist any N ′ such that xn′ ∈ Bx0 for all n′ ≥ N ′. Hence x1,x2, ... does not
converge to x in TB . uunionsq
Proposition 1 implies that the n-bisimulation topology may not straight-forwardly
be used to establish negative results concerning logical convergence. That it
may be used for positive cases is a corollary to Propositions 2 and 6 below. On
the upside, logical convergence coincides with convergence in the n-bisimulation
topology – i.e. Proposition 1 fails – when L has finite atoms. This is a corollary
to Proposition 5.
An alternative to a metric-based approach to topologies is to construct the
set of all open sets directly. Comparing the definition of logical convergence with
that of convergence in topological spaces is highly suggestive: Replacing every
occurrence of the formula ϕ with an open set U while replacing satisfaction
 with inclusion ∈ transforms the former definition into the latter. Hence the
collection of sets Uϕ = {x ∈X : x  ϕ}, ϕ ∈ LΛ, seems a reasonable candidate
for a topology. Alas, this collection is not closed under arbitrary unions, as all
formulas are finite. Hence it is not a topology. It does however constitute the
basis for a topology, in fact the somewhat influential Stone topology, TS .
4 That all models in X are image-finite is a sufficient condition, cf. the Hennessy-
Milner Theorem. See e.g. [14] or [27].
5 Space does not allow for a discussion of the remaining metrics of [1,17], but see [31].
The Stone topology is traditionally defined on the collection of complete the-
ories for some propositional, first-order or modal logic, but is straightforwardly
applicable to modal spaces. Moreover, it satisfies our desideratum:
Proposition 2. For any LΛ modal space X, a sequence x1,x2, ... logically con-
verges to the point x if, and only if, it converges to x in (X, TS).
Proof. Assume x1,x2, ... logically converges to x in X and that U containing
x is open in TS . Then there is a basis element Uϕ ⊆ U with x ∈ Uϕ. So x  ϕ.
By assumption, there exists an N such that xn  ϕ for all n ≥ N . Hence
xn ∈ Uϕ ⊆ U for all n ≥ N .
Assume x1,x2, ... converges to x in (X, TS) and let x  ϕ. Then x ∈ Uϕ,
which is open. As the sequence converges, there exists an N such that xn ∈ Uϕ
for all n ≥ N . Hence xn  ϕ for all n ≥ N . uunionsq
Apart from its attractive characteristic concerning convergence, working on
the basis of a logic, the Stone topology imposes a natural structure. As is evident
from its basis, every subset of X characterizable by a single Λ-proposition ϕ ∈
LΛ is clopen. If the logic Λ is compact and X saturated (see fn. 7), also the
converse is true: every clopen set is of the form Uϕ for some ϕ. We refer to [31] for
proofs and a precise characterization result. In this case, a subset is open, but not
closed, iff it is characterizable only by an infinitary disjunction of Λ-propositions,
and a subset if closed, but not open, iff it is characterizable only by an infinitary
conjunction of Λ-propositions. The Stone topology thus transparently reflects
the properties of logic, language and topology. Moreover, it enjoys practical
topological properties:
Proposition 3. For any LΛ modal space X, (X, TS) is Hausdorff and to-
tally disconnected. If Λ is (logically) compact6 and X is saturated7, then
(X, TS) is also (topologically) compact.
Proof. These properties are well-known for the Stone topology applied to com-
plete theories. For the topology applied to modal spaces, we defer to [31]. uunionsq
One may interject that, as having a metric may facilitate obtaining results,
it may cause a loss of tools to move away from the n-bisimulation topology.
The Stone topology, however, is metrizable. A family of metrics inducing it,
generalizing the Hamming distance to infinite strings by using weighted sums,
was introduced in [31]. We here present a sub-family, suited for modal spaces:
Definition 3. Let D ⊆ LΛ contain for every ψ ∈ LΛ some {ϕi}i∈I that Λ-
entails either ψ or ¬ψ, and let ϕ1,ϕ2, ... be an enumeration of D.
Let X be an LΛ modal space. For all x,y ∈X, for all k ∈ N, let
6 A logic Λ is logically compact if any arbitrary set A of formulas is Λ-consistent iff
every finite subset of A is Λ-consistent.
7 An LΛ modal space X is saturated iff for each Λ-consistent set of formulas A,
there is an x ∈ X such that x  A. Saturation relates to the notion of strong
completeness, cf. e.g. [14, Prop.4.12]. See [31] for its use in a more general context.
dk(x,y) =
{
0 if x  ϕ iff y  ϕ for ϕ ∈ ϕk
1 else
Let w : D −→ R>0 assign strictly positive weight to each ϕk in D such that
(w(ϕn)) forms a convergent series. Define the function dw :X
2 −→ R by
dw(x,y) =
∞∑
k=0
w(ϕk)dk(x,y)
for all x,y ∈ X. The set of these functions is denoted DX . Let DD,X =
∪D⊆LΛDX .
We refer to [31] for the proof establishing the following proposition:
Proposition 4. Let X be an LΛ modal space and dw belong to DX . Then dw
is a metric on X and the metric topology Tw induced by dw on X is the Stone
topology of Λ.
For a metric space (X, d), we will also write Xd.
With variable parameters D and w, DX allows one to vary the choice of
metric with the problem under consideration. E.g., if the n-bisimulation metric
seems apt, one could choose that, with one restriction:
Proposition 5. If X is an LΛ modal space with L based on a finite atom set,
then DX contains a topological equivalent to the n-bisimulation metric.
Proof (sketch). As L is based on a finite set of atoms, for each x ∈ X, n ∈ N0,
there exists a characteristic formula ϕx,n such that y  ϕx,n iff y -n x, cf. [27].
Let Dn = {ϕx,n : x ∈ X} and D = ∪n∈N0Dn. Then each Dn is finite and D
satisfies Definition 3. Finally, let w(ϕ) = 1|Dn| · 12n+1 for ϕ ∈ Dn. Then dw ∈ DX
and is equivalent to the n-bisimulation metric db. uunionsq
As a corollary to Proposition 5, it follows that, for finite atom languages, the
n-bisimulation topology is the Stone topology. This is not true in general, as
witnessed by Proposition 1 and the following:
Proposition 6. If X is an LΛ modal space with L based on a countably infinite
atom set, then the n-bisimulation metric topology on X is strictly finer than the
Stone topology on X.
Proof (sketch). We refer to [31] for details, but for TB 6⊆ TS , note that the set
Bx0 used in the proof of Prop. 1, is open in TB , but not in TS . uunionsq
With this comparison, we end our exposition of topologies on modal spaces.
4 Clean Maps on Modal Spaces
We focus on a class of maps induced by action models applied using product
update. Action models are a popular and widely applicable class of model trans-
formers, generalizing important constructions such as public announcements. An
especially general version of action models is multi-pointed action models with
postconditions. Postconditions allow action states in an action model to change
the valuation of atoms [12,19], thereby also allowing the representation of infor-
mation dynamics concerning situations that are not factually static. Permitting
multiple points allows the actual action states executed to depend on the pointed
Kripke model to be transformed, thus generalizing single-pointed action models.8
Amulti-pointed action model is a tuple ΣΓ = (JΣK,R, pre, post, Γ ) whereJΣK is a countable, non-empty set of actions. The map R : I → P(JΣK × JΣK)
assigns an accessibility relation Ri on JΣK to each agent i ∈ I. The map
pre : JΣK→ L assigns to each action a precondition, and the map
post : JΣK→ L assigns to each action a postcondition,9 which must be > or a
conjunctive clause10 over Φ. Finally, ∅ 6= Γ ⊆ JΣK is the set of designated actions.
To obtain well-behaved total maps on a modal spaces, we must invoke a set of
mild, but non-standard, requirements: Let X be a set of pointed Kripke models.
Call ΣΓ precondition finite if the set {pre(σ) ∈ LΛ : σ ∈ JΣK} is finite. This
is needed for our proof of continuity. Call ΣΓ exhaustive over X if for all
x ∈ X, there is a σ ∈ Γ such that x  pre(σ). This conditions ensures that the
action model ΣΓ is universally applicable on X. Finally, call ΣΓ deterministic
over X if X  pre(σ) ∧ pre(σ′) → ⊥ for each σ 6= σ′ ∈ Γ . Together with
exhaustivity, this condition ensures that the product of ΣΓ and any Ms ∈ X is
a (single-)pointed Kripke model, i.e., that the actual state after the updates is
well-defined and unique.
Let ΣΓ be exhaustive and deterministic over X and let Ms ∈ X. Then the
product update of Ms with ΣΓ , denoted Ms ⊗ ΣΓ , is the pointed Kripke
model (JMΣK , R′, J·K′, s′) withJMΣK = {(s, σ) ∈ JMK× JΣK : (M, s)  pre(σ)}
R′ = {((s, σ), (t, τ)) : (s, t) ∈ Ri and (σ, τ) ∈ Ri} , for all i ∈ NJpK′ = {(s, σ) :s ∈ JpK, post(σ) 2 ¬p} ∪ {(s, σ) :post(σ)  p} , for all p ∈ Φ
s′ = (s, σ) : σ ∈ Γ and Ms  pre(σ)
Call ΣΓ closing over X if for all x ∈ X, x⊗ΣΓ ∈ X. With ΣΓ exhaustive and
deterministic, ΣΓ and ⊗ induce a well-defined total map on X.
The class of maps of interest in the present is then the following:
Definition 4. Let X be an LΛ modal space. A map f :X →X is called clean
if there exists a precondition finite, multi-pointed action model ΣΓ closing, de-
terministic and exhaustive over X such that f(x) = y iff x ⊗ ΣΓ ∈ y for all
x ∈X.
8 Multi-pointed action models are also referred to as epistemic programs in [2], and
allow encodings akin to knowledge-based programs [22] of interpreted systems, cf. [42].
9 The precondition of σ specify the conditions under which σ is executable, while its
postcondition may dictate the posterior values of a finite, possibly empty, set of
atoms.
10 I.e. a conjuction of literals, where a literal is an atom or a negated atom.
Clean maps are total by the assumptions of being closing and exhaustive. They
are well-defined as f(x) is independent of the choice of representative for x:
If x′ ∈ x, then x′ ⊗ ΣΓ and x ⊗ ΣΓ are modally equivalent and hence define
the same point in X. The latter follows as multi-pointed action models applied
using product update preserve bisimulation [2], which implies modal equivalence.
Clean maps moreover play nicely with the Stone topology:
Proposition 7. Let f be a clean map on an LΛ modal space X. Then f is
continuous with respect to the Stone topology of Λ.
Proof (sketch). We defer to [31] for details, but offer a sketch: The map f is
shown uniformly continuous using the ε-δ formulation of continuity. The proof
relies on a lemma stating that for every dw ∈ DX and every  > 0, there are
formulas χ1, . . . , χl ∈ L such that every x ∈ X satisfies some χi and whenever
y  χi and z  χi for some i ≤ l, then dw(y, z) < . The main part of the
proof establishes the claim that there is a function δ : L → (0,∞) such that
for any ϕ ∈ L, if f(x)  ϕ and da(x, y) < δ(ϕ), then f(y)  ϕ. Setting δ =
min{δ(χi) : i ≤ l} then yields a δ with the desired property. uunionsq
With Proposition 7, we are positioned to state our main theorem:
Theorem 1. Let f be a clean map on a saturated LΛ modal space X with Λ
compact and let d ∈ DX . Then (Xd,f) is a topological dynamical system.
Proof. Propositions 2, 3, 4 and 7 jointly imply thatXd is a compact metric space
on which f is continuous, thus satisfying the requirements of e.g. [21,29,44]. uunionsq
With Theorem 1, we have, in what we consider a natural manner, situated
dynamic epistemic logic in the mathematical discipline of dynamical systems. A
core topic in this discipline is to understand the long-term, qualitative behavior
of maps on spaces. Central to this endeavor is the concept of recurrence, i.e.,
understanding when a system returns to previous states as time goes to infinity.
5 Recurrence in the Limit Behavior of Clean Maps
We represent results concerning the limit behavior of clean maps on modal
spaces. In establishing the required terminology, we follow [29]: Let f be a con-
tinuous map on a metric space Xd and x ∈ Xd. A point y ∈ X is a limit point11
for x under f if there is a strictly increasing sequence n1, n2, ... such that the
subsequence fn1(x), fn2(x), ... of (fn(x))n∈N0 converges to y. The limit set of
x under f is the set of all limit points for x, denoted ωf (x). Notably, ωf (x) is
closed under f : For y ∈ ωf (x) also f(y) ∈ ωf (x). We immediately obtain that
any modal system satisfying Theorem 1 has a nonempty limit set:
Proposition 8. Let (Xd,f) be as in Theorem 1. For any point x ∈ X, the
limit set of x under f is non-empty.
11 Or ω-limit point. The ω is everywhere omitted as time here only moves forward.
Proof. SinceX is is compact, every sequence inX has a convergent subsequence,
cf. e.g. [37, Thm. 28.2].
Proposition 8 does not inform us of the structure of said limit set. In the
study of dynamical systems, such structure is often sought through classifying
the possible repetitive behavior of a system, i.e., through the system’s recur-
rence properties. For such studies, a point x is called (positively) recurrent if
x ∈ ωf (x), i.e., if it is a limit point of itself.
The simplest structural form of recurrence is periodicity : For a point x ∈ X,
call the set Of (x) = {fn(x) : n ∈ N0} its orbit. The orbit Of (x) is periodic if
fn+k(x) = fn(x) for some n ≥ 0, k > 0; the least such k is the period of Of (x).
Periodicity is thus equivalent to Of (x) being finite. Related is the notion of a
limit cycle: a periodic orbit Of (x) is a limit cycle if it is the limit set of some
y not in the period, i.e., if Of (x) = ωf (y) for some y 6∈ Of (x).
It was conjectured by van Benthem that certain clean maps—those based
on finite action models and without postconditions—would, whenever applied
to a finite x, have a periodic orbit Of (x). I.e., after finite iterations, the map
would oscillate between a finite number of states. This was the content of van
Benthem’s “Finite Evolution Conjecture” [8]. The conjecture was refuted using
a counterexample by Sadzik in his 2006 paper, [43].12 The example provided by
Sadzik (his Example 33) uses an action model with only Boolean preconditions.
Interestingly, the orbit of the corresponding clean map terminates in a limit
cycle. This is a corollary to Proposition 9 below.
Before we can state the proposition, we need to introduce some terminology.
Call a multi-pointed action model ΣΓ finite if JΣK is finite, Boolean if pre(σ) is
a Boolean formula for all σ ∈ JΣK, and static if post(σ) = > for all σ ∈ JΣK. We
apply the same terms to a clean map f based on ΣΓ . In this terminology, Sadzik
showed that for any finite, Boolean, and static clean map f : X →X, if the orbit
Of (x) is periodic, then it has period 1.13 This insightful result immediates the
following:
Proposition 9. Let (Xd,f) be as in Theorem 1 with f finite, Boolean, and
static. For all x ∈X, the orbit Of (x) is periodic with period 1.
Proof. By Prop. 8, the limit set ωf (x) of x under f is non-empty. Sadzik’s result
shows that it contains a single point. Hence (fn(x))n∈N0 converges to this point.
As the limit set ωf (x) is closed under f , its unique point is a fix-point. uunionsq
Proposition 9 may be seen as a partial vindication of van Benthem’s conjec-
ture: Forgoing the requirement of reaching the limit set in finite time and the
possibility of modal preconditions, the conjecture holds, even if the initial state
has an infinite set of worlds JxK. This simple recurrent behavior is, however, not
the general case. More complex clean maps may exhibit nontrivial recurrence,
i.e., produce non-periodic orbits with recurrent points:
12 We paraphrase van Benthem and Sadzik using the terminology introduced.
13 See [16] for an elegant and generalizing exposition.
Proposition 10. There exist finite, static, but non-Boolean, clean maps that
exhibit nontrivial recurrence.
Proposition 11. There exist finite, Boolean, but non-static, clean maps that
exhibit nontrivial recurrence.
We show these propositions below, building a clean map which, from a selected
initial state, has uncountably many limit points, despite the orbit being only
countable. Moreover, said orbit also contains infinitely many recurrent points.
In fact, every element of the orbit is recurrent. We rely on Lemma 1 in the proof.
A proof of Lemma 1.1 may be found in [32], a proof of Lemma 1.2 in [15].
Lemma 1. Any Turing machine can be emulated using a set X of S5 pointed
Kripke models for finite atoms and a finite multi-pointed action model ΣΓ de-
terministic over X. Moreover, ΣΓ may be chosen 1. static, but non-Boolean, or
2. Boolean, but non-static.
Proof (of Propostitions 10 and 11). For both propositions, we use a Turing ma-
chine ad infinitum iterating the successor function on the natural numbers. Num-
bers are represented in mirrored base-2, i.e., with the leftmost digit the lowest.
Such a machine may be build with alphabet {., 0, 1,unionsq}, where the symbol . is
used to mark the starting cell and unionsq is the blank symbol. We omit the exact
description of the machine here. Of importance is the content of the tape: Omit-
ting blank (unionsq) cells, natural numbers are represented as illustrated in Fig. 1.
0 : . 0 2 : . 0 1 4 : . 0 0 1 6 : . 0 1 1 8 : . 0 0 0 1
1 : . 1 3 : . 1 1 5 : . 1 0 1 7 : . 1 1 1 9 : . 1 0 0 1
Fig. 1. Mirrored base-2 Turing tape representation of 0, .., 9 ∈ N0, blank cells omitted.
Notice that the mirrored notation causes perpetual change close to the start cell, ..
Initiated with its read-write head on the cell with the start symbol . of a tape
with content n, the machine will go through a number of configurations before
returning the read-write head to the start cell with the tape now having content
n+1. Auto-iterating, the machine will thus, over time, produce a tape that will
have contained every natural number in order.
This Turing machine may be emulated by a finite ΣΓ on a set X cf. Lemma 1.
Omitting the details14, the idea is that the Turing tape, or a finite fragment,
thereof may be encoded as a pointed Kripke model: Each cell of the tape cor-
responds to a state, with the cell’s content encoded by additional structure,15
which is modally expressible. By structuring the cell states with two equivalence
relations and atoms u and e true at cells with odd (even) index respectively, (cf.
Fig. 2), also the position of a cell is expressible. The designated state corresponds
to the start cell, marked ..
14 The details differ depending on whether ΣΓ must be static, but non-Boolean for
Prop. 10, or Boolean, but non-static for Prop. 11. See resp. [32] and [15].
15 For Prop. 11, tape cell content may be encoded using atomic propositions, changable
through postconditions, cf. [15]; for Prop. 10, cell content is written by adding and
removing additional states, cf. [32].
e, ϕ.
c0
u, ϕ0
c1
e, ϕ1
c2
u, ϕ0
c3
e, ϕ1
c4
a b a b
Fig. 2. A pointed Kripke model emulating the configuration of the Turing machine
with cell content representing the number 10. The designated state is the underlined
c0. Each state is labeled with a formula ϕ., ϕ0 or ϕ1 expressing its content. Relations
a and b allow expressing distance of cells: That c0 satisfies ♦a(u ∧ ♦b(e ∧ ϕ1)) exactly
expresses that cell c2 contains a 1. Omitted are reflexive loops for relations, and the
additional structure marking cell content and read-write head position.
Let (cn)n∈N0 be the sequence of configurations of the machine when initiated
on a tape with content 0. Each cn may be represented by a pointed Kripke model,
obtaining a sequence (xn)n∈N0 . By Lemma 1, there thus exists a ΣΓ such that
for all n, xn ⊗ ΣΓ = xn+1. Hence, moving to the full modal space X for the
language used, a clean map f : X →X based on ΣΓ will satisfy f(xn) = xn+1
for all n. The Turing machine’s run is thus emulated by (fk(x0))k∈N0 .
Let (c′n)n∈N0 be the subsequence of (cn)n∈N0 where the machine has finished
the successor operation and returned its read write head to its starting position
., ready to embark on the next successor step. The tape of the first 9 of these
c′n are depicted in Fig. 1. Let (x′n)n∈N0 be the corresponding subsequence of
(fk(x0))k∈N0 . We show that (x′n)n∈N0 has uncountably many limit points:
For each subset Z of N, let cZ be a tape with content 1 on cell i iff i ∈ Z
and 0 else. On the Kripke model side, let the corresponding xZ ∈ X be a model
structurally identical to those of (x′n)n∈N0 , but satisfying ϕ1 on all “cell states”
distance i ∈ Z from the designated “.” state, and ϕ0 on all other.16 The set
{xZ : Z ⊆ N} is uncountable, and each xZ is a limit point of x: For each Z ⊆ N
and n ∈ N, there are infinitely many k for which xk  ϕ iff xZ  ϕ for all ϕ of
modal depth at most n. Hence, for every n, the set {xk : db(xk,xZ) < 2−n} is
infinite, with db the equivalent of the n-bisimulation metric, cf. Prop. 5. Hence,
for each of the uncountably many Z ⊆ N, xZ is a limit point of the sequence x.
Finally, every x′k ∈ (x′n)n∈N0 is recurrent: That x′k ∈ ωf (x′k) follows from x′k
being a limit point of (x′n)n∈N0 , which it is as x′k = x
Z for some Z ⊆ N.17 As
the set of recurrent points is thus infinite, it cannot be periodic. uunionsq
As a final result on the orbits of clean maps, we answer an open question:
After having exemplified a period 2 system, Sadzik [43] notes that it is unknown
whether finite, static, but non-Boolean, clean maps exhibiting longer periods
exist. They do:
Proposition 12. For any n ∈ N, there exists finite, static, but non-Boolean
clean maps with periodic orbits of period n. This is also true for finite Boolean,
but non-static, clean maps.
16 The exact form is straightforward from the constructions used in [32] and [15].
17 A similar argument shows that all xZ with Z ⊆ N co-infinite are recurrent points.
Hence ωf (x′k) for any x
′
k ∈ (x′n)n∈N0 contains uncountably many recurrent points.
Proof. For the given n, find a Turing machine that, from some configuration,
loops with period n. From here, Lemma 1 does the job. uunionsq
Finally, we note that brute force determination of a clean map’s orbit prop-
erties is not in general a feasible option:
Proposition 13. The problems of determining whether a Boolean and non-
static, or a static and non-Boolean, clean map, a) has a periodic orbit or not,
and b) contains a limit cycle or not, are both undecidable.
Proof. The constructions from the proofs of Lemma 1 allows encoding the halting
problem into either question. uunionsq
6 Discussion and Future Venues
We consider Theorem 1 our main contribution. With it, an interface between
the discrete semantics of dynamic epistemic logic with dynamical systems have
been provided; thus the former has been situated in the mathematical field of the
latter. This paves the way for the application of results from dynamical systems
theory and related fields to the information dynamics of dynamic epistemic logic.
The term nontrivial recurrence is adopted from Hasselblatt and Katok, [29].
They remark that “[nontrivial recurrence] is the first indication of complicated
asymptotic behavior.” Propositions 11 and 10 indicate that the dynamics of
action models and product update may not be an easy landscape to map. Has-
selblatt and Katok continue: “In certain low-dimensional situations [...] it is pos-
sible to give a comprehensive description of the nontrivial recurrence that can
appear.” [29, p. 24]. That the Stone topology is zero-dimensional fuels the hope
that general topology and dynamical systems theory yet has perspectives to offer
on dynamic epistemic logic. One possible direction is seeking a finer parametriza-
tion of clean maps combined with results specific to zero-dimensional spaces, as
found, e.g., in the field of symbolic dynamics [36]. But also other venues are
possible: The introduction of [29] is counts an inspiration.
The approach presented furthermore applies to model transformations be-
yond multi-pointed action models and product update. Given the equivalence
shown in [33] between single-pointed action model product update and general
arrow updates, we see no reason to suspect that “clean maps” based on the lat-
ter should not be continuous on modal spaces. A further conjecture is that the
action-priority update of [5] on plausibility models18 yields “clean maps” continu-
ous w.r.t. the suited Stone topology, and that this may be shown using a variant
of our proof of the continuity of clean maps. A more difficult case is the PDL-
transformations of General Dynamic Dynamic Logic [25] given the signature
change the operation involves.
18 Hence also the multi-agent belief revision policies lexicographic upgrade and elite
change, also known as radical and conservative upgrade, introduced in [9], cf. [5].
There is a possible clinch between the suggested approach and epistemic logic
with common knowledge. The state space of a dynamical system is compact.
The Stone topology for languages including a common knowledge operator is
non-compact. Hence, it cannot constitute the space of a dynamical system—but
its one-point compactification may. We are currently working on this clinch,
the consequences of compactification, and relations to the problem of attaining
common knowledge, cf. [28].
Questions also arise concerning the dynamic logic of dynamic epistemic logic.
Propositions 10 and 11 indicate that there is more to the semantic dynamics of
dynamic epistemic logic than is representable by finite compositional dynamic
modalities—even when including a Kleene star. An open question still stands
on how to reason about limit behavior. One interesting venue stems from van
Benthem [10]. He notes19 that the reduction axioms of dynamic epistemic logic
could possibly be viewed on par with differential equations of quantitative dy-
namical systems. As modal spaces are zero-dimensional, they are imbeddable in
R cf. [37, Thm 50.5], turning clean maps into functions from R to R, possibly
representable as discrete-time difference equations.
An alternative approach is possible given by consulting Theorem 1. With
Theorem 1, a connection arises between dynamic epistemic logic and dynamic
topological logic (see e.g. [23,24,34,35]): Each system (Xd,f) may be considered
a dynamic topological model with atom set LΛ and the ‘next’ operator’s seman-
tics given by an application of f , equivalent to a 〈f〉 dynamic modality of DEL.
The topological ‘interior’ operator has yet no DEL parallel. A ‘henceforth’ op-
erator allows for a limited characterization of recurrence [35]. We are wondering
about and wandering around the connections between a limit set operator with
semantics x  [ωf ]ϕ iff y  ϕ for all y ∈ ωf (x), dynamic topological logic and
the study of oscillations suggested by van Benthem [11].
With the focal point on pointed Kripke models and action model transfor-
mations, we have only considered a special case of logical dynamics. It is our
firm belief that much of the methodology here suggested is generalizable: With
structures described logically using a countable language, the notion of logical
convergence will coincide with topological convergence in the Stone topology
on the quotient space modulo logical equivalence, and the metrics introduced
will, mutatis mutandis, be applicable to said space [31]. The continuity of maps
and compactness of course depends on what the specifics of the chosen model
transformations and the compactness of the logic amount to.
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